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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Morris appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction 
relief, after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred by 
rejecting his claim that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel in 
relation to his guilty plea and his Rule 35 motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case, Morris pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of 
possession of sexually exploitative material. (R., pp.10-11, 52.) The district court 
sentenced Morris to a unified term of 24 years with three years fixed. (R., pp.10, 52-
53.) Through counsel, Morris filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. 
(R., p.53.) Morris also filed a timely appeal from the judgment of conviction, and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Id.) 
After remittitur issued in his appeal, Morris filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief, claiming that his sentence was excessive and that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.11-12, 15.) The district court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the petition. (R., p.51; see also Tr.) Following that hearing, the 
district court denied all of Morris's claims and dismissed his petition for post-conviction 
relief. (R., pp.52-62.) Morris filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.64-65.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Morris's Appellant's brief does not appear to include a statement of the issues. 
The sole issue in this case is whether Morris failed to show that the district court 
erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief, following an evidentiary hearing. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
Morris Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial, Following An 
Evidentiary Hearing, Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Morris failed 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel and so denied his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.52-60.) On appeal, 
Morris contends that he proved ineffective assistance of counsel and so should have 
been granted post-conviction relief. (See Appellant's brief.) Application of the correct 
legal standards to Morris's claim, however, shows that he failed to prove that his 
attorney was ineffective. The district court properly denied Morris's petition for post-
conviction relief and should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act are civil, where 
there is competent and substantial evidence to support a decision made after an 
evidentiary hearing on an application for post-conviction relief, that decision will not be 
disturbed on appeal. Odom v. State, 121 Idaho 625, 826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Morris's Post-Conviction Petition 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which the claim is based. I.C.R. 
57(c); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). At an evidentiary 
hearing, the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters within the province of the trial 
3 
court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). The 
district court's factual findings will not be disturbed if "supported by substantial, even if 
conflicting, evidence in the record." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 
941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)). 
On review of an order denying post-conviction relief, the lower court's decision that the 
burden of proof has not been met is entitled to great weight, and a finding that a party 
has failed to prove his claim will not be set aside unless that finding is clearly erroneous. 
Larkin, 115 Idaho at 74, 764 P.2d at 441. Morris has failed to show that the district 
court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
1. Morris's Excessive Sentence Claim Fails Under The Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act 
In his original petition, Morris claimed that his sentence was excessive and 
violated his constitutional rights. (R., p.11.) This claim fails on two bases: First, 
Morris's excessive sentence claim is not viable under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act, see I.C. § 19-4901, and was therefore properly dismissed. Second, 
Morris already presented this claim on direct appeal and the claim was finally 
adjudicated. See State v. Morris, Docket No. 39450, 2012 Unpublished Op. No. 643, 6-
7 (Idaho Appeals, September 24, 2012). Morris was therefore precluded from raising 
this issue in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding. I.C. § 19-4908. The district 
court correctly denied and dismissed this claim. 
2. Morris Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
In his petition, Morris also alleged that his attorney was ineffective because he 
promised probation if Morris pleaded guilty, failed to object to the polygraph results, and 
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failed to include additional information in support of Morris's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.12, 
15.) Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective assistance 
of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and 
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To 
show deficient performance, the petitioner must "overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating 'that counsel's representation 
did not meet objective standards of competence."' Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 121, 124, 
952 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648-49, 
873 P.2d 898, 902-03 (Ct. App. 1994)). Appellate courts "will not second guess counsel 
without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-
470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). When the alleged 
deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations 
omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky. 559 U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) 
(citation omitted). 
In its "Order Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the district court 
articulated the applicable legal standards, made detailed factual findings, and explained 
5 
the reasons Morris failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (See R., pp.53-60.) The state adopts as part of its 
argument on appeal the district court's reasoning for its denial of Morris's claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to Morris's guilty plea and polygraph results, 
as set forth at pages 54-58 of the district court's order, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as "Appendix A." 
The state does not, however, adopt the district court's analysis in relation to the 
Rule 35 motion, because, although it reached the correct result, the court's analysis is 
incorrect. Regarding the Rule 35 motion, the district court found that Morris's trial 
counsel was deficient for filing the motion too quickly and without additional information 
(R., pp.59-60); however, the court decided, Morris's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim still failed because he failed to show prejudice (id). This analysis is erroneous in 
two respects: First, because there is no constitutional right to counsel in relation to a 
Rule 35 motion, a petitioner cannot bring a successful claim that he was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel in relation to Rule 35 motions. Second, even if Morris 
could bring such a claim, there is no requirement that a Rule 35 motion be filed with 
new and additional information; therefore counsel did not render deficient performance 
by timely filing the Rule 35 motion without new and additional information. 
A person convicted of a crime has no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1963). The Sixth Amendment only guarantees a criminal 
defendant the right to counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings 
against him. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006) (citing 
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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 
P.2d 415 (1981)). Although this right encompasses the first direct appeal, it does not 
extend to post-conviction proceedings. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 
(2007); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555. "The determination whether [a] hearing is a 'critical 
stage' requiring the provision of counsel depends ... upon an analysis 'whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the *** confrontation and the ability 
to help avoid that prejudice."' Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (asterisks 
original, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). 
Rule 35 challenges do not create a critical stage of the proceedings. United 
States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (11th Cir.1991 ). This is because a Rule 35 
motion can "only benefit the defendant by reducing his sentence which had already 
become final." United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 2005). There is, 
therefore, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel on a Rule 35 motion. Taylor, 414 F.3d 
at 537; United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996). Where a defendant 
has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant cannot be 
deprived of that right. Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982). Therefore, 
Morris's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
In the alternative, even if Morris could bring this claim, it fails on the merits 
because Morris has not shown that his attorney's performance was deficient. Morris 
asserted, and the district court found, that he requested that his trial counsel file a Rule 
35 motion on his behalf. (R., p.54.) Trial counsel filed that motion "a mere 10 days after 
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sentencing." (R., p.60.) The sentencing court denied the motion the following day. 
(See #39450 R., p.140.1) 
The district court found that trial counsel's "performance was blatantly deficient" 
because counsel "gave the Court nothing new to consider" in relation to Morris's original 
sentence. (R., p.59.) But the presentation of new and additional information is a 
standard for appellate review, not a requisite for filing a motion for reconsideration from 
a trial court. See I. C.R. 35; cf. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P .3d 838, 
840 (2007). On appellate review, if the original sentence was not an abuse of 
discretion, then the denial of a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, without the 
presentation of any new or additional information, cannot possibly be an abuse of 
discretion either. This logic prevents defendants from attempting to use an appeal from 
the denial of a Rule 35 motion to challenge their original sentences. Huffman, 144 
Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. It does not, however, prevent a district court from 
exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence without any new or additional information. 
The Court of Appeals has previously held that an attorney is required to file a 
Rule 35 motion within the 120-day time limit prescribed by Rule 35. State v. Parvin, 137 
Idaho 783, 785, 53 P.3d 834, 836 (Ct. App. 2002). The Court of Appeals has also held 
that it is "defense counsel's responsibility to precipitate action on [a Rule 35 motion] 
within a reasonable time frame." State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d 624, 626 
(Ct. App. 1998). The state is aware of no appellate court, however, which has ever held 
that an attorney has a responsibility to present new and additional information to the 
sentencing judge with the Rule 35 motion. Morris's trial counsel filed the Rule 35 
1 Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state filed a motion requesting the 
Court to take judicial notice of the record in Docket No. 39450. 
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motion within the time limit prescribed by Rule 35. The motion was ruled upon within a 
reasonable time frame. Morris has therefore failed to show that his attorney was 
objectively deficient in relation to his Rule 35 motion. 
"Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory" this 
Court can apply "the correct theory" and affirm. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 
P.3d 895, 901 (2001 ). The state requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
ultimately correct ruling, that Morris failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel in 
relation to his Rule 35 motion, on the correct theory that there is no constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of counsel in relation to a Rule 35 motion. In the alternative, 
the state requests that this Court affirm on the basis that Morris failed to show his 
attorney was objectively deficient when counsel promptly filed the Rule 35 motion and 
received a timely ruling on that motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying, after an evidentiary hearing, Morris's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2014. 
J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of July, 2014, served two true and 
correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing the copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DONALD GENE MORRIS 
IDOC # 101466 
ISCI 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
RJS/pm 
~ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
DONALD GENE MORRIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
Tim Williams for Petitioner Morris. 
Case No. CV-2013-0346 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 




This matter came before the court for an evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2013 on 
the issues raised by Morris in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Morris was 
sentenced in CR 2011-6219 on November 4, 2011 on fifteen counts of Possession of 
Sexually Exploitive Material. On Counts one through five, he was sentenced to a 
$200.00 fine and an 8 year unified sentence, with one year determinate and seven 
years indeterminate. Each count was sentenced concurrent to the other four. He was 
given the same sentence on counts six through ten and eleven through fifteen. Each set 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 1 
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of five counts was ordered to be served consecutive to the others, resulting in a total 
sentence of 3 years fixed and 21 years indeterminate. The petitioner filed a Rule 35 
Motion for Reconsideration on November 14, 2011. The motion was denied without 
hearing on November 15, 2011. The petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on 
December 2, 2011. The Judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and a remittitur 
was issued on November 28, 2012. Morris filed the instant action on January 23, 2013. 
Counsel was appointed thereafter. An initial post-conviction petition must be filed within 
one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an 
appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal. I.C. §19-4902. 
This petition was timely filed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings and conclusions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52. 
At the defendant's request, the Court took Judicial Notice of the transcript and the PSI 
from the underlying criminal proceeding. The State failed to introduce any evidence or 
request that any documents be included via judicial notice. Because of this, the Court, 
on its own motion, will take judicial notice of the plea agreement, the guilty plea advisory 
form, the Judgment and the Court of Appeals opinion from the underlying criminal case. 
Morris has made several claims in his petition. He asserts that the sentence 
imposed was excessive. However, the sentence was directly appealed and affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals. This issue merits no further analysis as it is moot. His remaining 
claims all derive from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. He claims that his 
counsel was deficient by promising him probation, failing to object at sentencing and 
filing an insufficient Rule 35 motion. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 2 
000053 
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At the hearing, Morris testified that early on in his representation, his attorney 
George Essma, represented to him that he would be granted probation as a first time 
offender. Later, Essma informed him that he had to participate in the psychosexual 
exam and polygraph in order to be granted probation. Morris testified that he would not 
have entered a guilty plea nor participated in the psychosexual had this promise not 
been made. As will be discussed, this claim fails for multiple reasons. 
Morris also testified that he believed the polygraph was flawed because he took 
the exam after only a few hours of sleep. The polygraph administrator informed him this 
could affect his results. However, neither this warning nor Morris' lack of sleep is 
recorded in either the polygrapher's report or the psychosexual exam. Morris testified 
that Essma was made aware of this potential skew to the results but failed to mention it 
at sentencing, despite Morris' request that he do so. 
Finally, Morris testified that he requested Essma file a Rule 35 motion on his 
behalf. A motion was filed but Morris argues that it was insufficient because Essma 
failed to include any argument as to why leniency should be granted. Morris' testimony 
is unchallenged in this record and the Court will find it as fact because of the lack of 
contradicting evidence. 1 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Counsel's promise of probation does not equate to a coerced guilty plea 
because the petitioner was repeatedly warned that no promises regarding his 
sentence could be valid. 
1 The State does not concede this point but offered no evidence to contradict Morris's testimony on this 
issue. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 3 
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Morris seems to claim that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea and 
participating in a psychosexual exam by his lawyer. He stated at the hearing that would 
not have done either if he had not been promised probation by his lawyer, George 
Essma. 
In spite of Morris' assertions, the record is clear that Morris was told, several 
times, that no promises could be made regarding sentencing. The plea agreement was 
for an open recommendation by the State and did not bind the Court to any agreement. 
Prior to entering his plea, he completed a guilty plea advisory form that clearly asked if 
he was entering his plea based on any promises regarding his sentence to which he 
responded "no." At the change of plea hearing, he was advised by the Court that no 
promises could be made regarding his sentence. Despite each of these advisements, 
he proceeded to enter a plea of guilty to fifteen counts. Moreover, a direct colloquy 
between the judge and Morris was conducted at sentencing to determine the 
voluntariness of his plea. Morris affirmed that he understood what he was doing, that no 
one forced him to enter a plea, that it was voluntary, and that he was not acting under 
any compulsion. All of these advisements contradict Morris' argument that his plea was 
coerced. 
The Court is aware that a plea can still be considered involuntary if it is based on 
inaccurate or incorrect advice from counsel. "The longstanding test for determining the 
validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 
472, 180 P.3d 511 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 
376, 386 (2004)). 'Where a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 4 
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process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 
depends upon whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (citing Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 
857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). "The two part Strickland test applies to challenges 
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Morris v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58 (1985). In the context of a guilty plea, an applicant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, in order satisfy the second prong of the 
Strickland test. 
Morris testified that Essma promised him he would get probation. Even if this is 
true, Morris was repeatedly advised that neither the Court nor the State was bound to 
any predetermined sentence. Moreover, as set forth above, the record at the plea 
hearing and sentencing absolutely contradicts an assertion that counsel coerced a plea. 
The record instead shows that the Court made several inquiries regarding Morris's 
voluntariness and desire to proceed on a plea of guilty. On the basis of this thorough 
record, this Court cannot conclude that there was ineffective assistance of counsel 
regarding the plea or that Morris was prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Even if 
counsel did "promise," Morris was warned in multiple ways that such a promise could 
not be valid and that he should not rely on such a promise. 
Finally, in the bargained for plea agreement, Morris agreed to participate in a 
psychosexual exam. His allegation that he would have refused to participate later is not 
convincing, since he willingly agreed to participate. He was then advised by the Court 
that he could enact his right to remain silent and not participate. Despite this advice, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 5 
000056 
• 
Morris chose to fully participate in the exam. With the Court's warning so clear in the 
record, Morris cannot convincingly claim that he was forced into participating. His claims 
of coercion are therefore denied. 
B. Essma's performance was defective when he failed to object or to inform the 
Court at sentencing that the polygraph results could be skewed but the 
petitioner has failed to show prejudice. 
Morris testified that he had only slept for 3-4 hours the night before his polygraph 
exam. During the test, he was advised that this could skew his results. He informed 
Essma of this detail but the information was never passed on to the Court. Morris 
argues that Essma's failure to object to the report was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant 
"reasonably competent assistance of counsel." State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 95, 967 
P.2d 702, 709 (1998). Likewise, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which is made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, assures a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063- 2064 (1984); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Our Supreme Court has 
adopted the two-prong Strickland test to evaluate whether a criminal defendant received 
effective assistance of counsel for post-conviction relief purposes. State v. Mathews, 
133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999); see also Wood, 132 Idaho at 95, 967 
P.2d at 709. 
A defendant seeking post-conviction relief based upon an alleged lack of 
effective counsel must prove that 1) counsel's performance was deficient and 2) that 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 6 
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this deficiency was the source of actual prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also 
Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306, 986 P.2d at 329; Wood, 132 Idaho at 95-96, 967 P.2d at 
709-10. To show professional deficiency, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002). To prove prejudice, the 
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceedings would likely have been different. Id. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Assuming that all of Morris' assertions are true, the Court finds that it was 
deficient performance by Essma to fail to mention the sleeplessness to the Court. Prior 
to sentencing, the information could have been confirmed and another polygraph could 
have been ordered to confirm the results of the first if necessary considering the Court 
relied on the negative polygraph results. Clearly, it would have been in his client's favor 
to mention the information and see how the Court wanted to proceed. Failing to do so 
was deficient. 
However, Morris has failed to prove the second prong required by Strickland. 
Morris must show how Essma's failure resulted in prejudice. He has presented no 
evidence for this Court to review that demonstrates a different result would have 
occurred had Essma objected to the report. The court does not have a differing 
polygraph or even an affidavit from a provider stating that the results could vary. Without 
any new evidence, the Court cannot find that Morris was prejudiced by Essma's 
deficient performance. Therefore, this claim must also be denied. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION - 7 
000058 
• 
C. Essma provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to include any 
argument when he filed a Motion under Rule 35 requesting leniency from the 
Sentencing Judge. 
As discussed above, Morris must show that Essma's performance was both 
deficient and prejudicial when claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. A Rule 35 motion 
may challenge a sentence as being excessive, unduly severe, and/or unreasonable at the 
time it was originally imposed. State v. Jensen, 137 Idaho 240 (Ct.App.2002). A Rule 35 
Motion to reduce a legally imposed sentence is essentially a plea for leniency and is 
directed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Where a sentence as originally 
imposed is not illegal, the defendant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, 
and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Henderson, 121 Idaho 385, 393 (1992) 
(emphasis added). When a defendant does not identify what evidence he might have 
produced at a hearing that could not have been produced through affidavits, the district 
court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a hearing on his Rule 35 motion. 
State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830 (Ct.App.1992). 
The law is clear that a defendant has the burden to provide information and 
evidence to convince the Court that leniency is reasonable. In the motion submitted to the 
trial Court, Essma included absolutely no argument whatsoever. The motion he filed was 
as good as filing no motion at all. He gave the Court nothing new to consider and this is 
not sufficient to meet the burden required in a Rule 35 motion. His performance was 
blatantly deficient. 
However, this Court finds that Morris has not carried his burden to show why this 
conduct was prejudicial. Since no evidence or argument was presented at the evidentiary 
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hearing, the Court is left only to imagine what could have been included. It is conceivable 
that some information could have convinced the trial court judge to reconsider. This is 
especially true when Morris has suggested that he had concerns about the polygraph and 
where there were recommendations for probation presented. But, as was the case with the 
polygraph issue, Morris has made no showing of what evidence Essrna should have 
proffered to the Sentencing Court. The record is clear that the Sentencing Court carefully 
considered Morris' background and the circumstances of the crimes. The Court 
determined that a significant penitentiary sentence was warranted. Rarely are defendants 
successful in convincing a sentencing judge to reconsider a sentence. Here, the Rule 35 
motion was filed a mere 10 days after sentencing. It is inconceivable that Morris' situation 
changed in the interim between sentencing and filing of the motion to warrant leniency. If it 
did, Morris has failed to make a showing of that change in the proceeding. Thus, he has 
not established the prejudice prong of Strickland regarding his Rule 35 claim. 
CONCLUSION 
All of Morris' claims are denied and the matter shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
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